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ABSTRACT: In 1973, German historian Arno Peters unveiled the “Peters projection,” a map 
that challenged the Eurocentric Mercator style by redrawing the so-called “Third World” to 
appear more prominent on the global landscape. The projection sparked intense debate among 
cartographers about the overt use of ideology in mapping, while simultaneously championed by 
international groups (from the UN to church organizations) as a corrective against the 
marginalization of developing nations. This essay addresses how the Peters map became a 
rhetorical emblem for an internationalist identity within the contentious spatial conceptions 
constraining the Cold War. Ultimately, the Peters projection, despite its radicalism, constituted a 
“recolonization” that supported logics of Western liberal development in the Third World.  
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In May 1973, a little-known West German socialist historian named Arno Peters called a press 
conference in Bonn. Amongst a group of 300-plus international academics, journalists, 
government and NGO representatives, Peters unveiled what he and his publishers would later 
tout as “the greatest single advance in map-making in over 400 years” (Peters, 1983). Peters’ 
map used an equal-area projection that rectified latitude lines at the 45th parallel. And indeed the 
map startled with its stretched shapes—Europe is now significantly smaller than in the famed 
Mercator projection, with the Southern hemispheres elongated, and Africa as a defining center of 
vision (Figure 1). According to The Guardian (1973), Peters stated bluntly at the conference that, 
“Mercator presents a fully false picture, particularly regarding the non-white-peopled lands. It 
over-values the white man and distorts the picture of the world to the advantage of the colonial 
masters of the time” (p. 15).  
  
2 
This “radical” map itself was by no means innovative—in fact, Peters was replicating a 
long-forgotten 1885 projection by a Scottish pastor and “gentleman scientist” who was dabbling 
in cartography (Gall, 1885). But the new appropriation of this simple map was innovative, as its 
makers and circulators placed it into a charged context of tumultuous decolonization and Cold 
War tensions over the development of the so-called “Third World.” Rather than an 
academic/technical innovation, the Peters map is noteworthy as a rhetorical event, challenging its 
diverse audiences to conceive of cartography as a provocative and powerful communicative 
medium for change, not simply as a representation of space. In the process, Peters ambitiously 
and self-consciously attempted to change the way a global audience envisioned their place within 
the world through an explosive mixture of ideology, science, and social advocacy (Peters, 1976).  
The “Peters projection,” as it came to be known, took on an active life and had a staying 
power that even the relentlessly self-promoting Peters could not have anticipated. A diverse array 
of religious and charitable organizations, transnational policymakers, and schools all embraced 
the map. By 2002, at least 83 million copies of the Peters map had been estimated in 
international circulation, becoming in Crampton’s estimation (1994), “the best-known map in the 
world, excepting only the Mercator” (p. 22). Due to its simple science and unabashed ideological 
stance, the Peters map was unique in its ability to incite equal vitriol and praise (Maling, 1974; 
Loxton, 1985; Sriskandarajah, 2003). Cartography’s disciplinarians were particularly upset: 
Canadian geographer Thomas Wray (1978) wrote that the projection and its campaign were a 
collection of “half-truths based on muddy thinking,” (pp. 28–29) while the German Cartographic 
Society (1985) made an official edict against the Peters map, deciding that it “completely fails to 
convey the manifold global, economic and political relationships of our times” (p. 110). It was 
the kind of map that was condemned in the United Nation’s Secretariat News (“…it is not 
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advisable for the United Nations to adopt the Peters map for any publication, let alone endorse 
it”), while simultaneously printed and distributed by the UN Development Programme in its 115 
international offices (Robinson, 1985, pp. 110–11). Peters commented that “public discussion 
was such as had not been known in the history of cartography. I attribute this to the fact that the 
debate over my map was in reality not a struggle about a projection as such but over a world 
picture. Clearly, ideology had entered the struggle” (Kaiser, 1987, p. 2). 
The Peters map’s complex function as a vital ideological struggle over a “world picture” 
is the entry point for this essay. During the era of anti-colonial national independence, the Peters 
map stridently critiqued traditional Cold War, East-West geopolitics, and radically politicized 
“Third World” area. However, I argue that, by assuming many formal conventions of the very 
maps the Peters projection attempted to indict and through its appropriation as an icon, the map 
created a recolonization of the Third World built on a new set of powerful interests—those of 
Cold War development. Discourses of international development were primarily directed by 
Western elites hoping to secure an uncertain post-WWII landscape for control and surveillance 
by the First and Second World. The Peters map justifies that control by adhering to Western 
ideologies of liberal re-distribution, and equality and upholding a three-tiered world where 
developing nations are continually “becoming.”  
In this process, the rhetorical practice of cartography itself is implicated—while Arno 
Peters sought to indict the colonialist origins of world maps, the visual conventions and the 
ensuing reproductions of (and debate over) his map still cast the emergent “South” as a 
repository of Western interests and structures. This recolonization may have lacked the brute 
force of old-style European colonialism, but it still favored a system of civilizational hierarchies 
and elites (in this case, the liberal, expert cartographer and enlightened, humanitarian 
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policymaker). In Walter Mignolo’s terms, colonialism may have ended, but the “coloniality of 
power” did not fade away (2002, p. 62). Thus, even in a radical, anti-colonial map such as the 
Peters projection, cartography struggles against its own imperial, colonizing history. 
Raka Shome and Radha S. Hegde (2002) have emphasized the importance of 
“historicizing” the modes of communication by which the international, post World War II 
landscape was articulated, and particularly how “institutionalized knowledge” in the era was 
“always subject to forces of colonialism, nation, geopolitics, and history” (251). This essay 
situates the institutionalized knowledge of cartography as a vital mode of communication for 
critiquing the historical shift when the de-colonizing nations of the Southern hemisphere became 
newly “colonized” subjects of a worldwide program of development. If we accept Shome’s claim 
(2003), for example, that space “functions as a technology—a means and a medium—of power 
that is socially constituted through material relations that enable the communication of specific 
politics,” then communication scholars can and must contextualize and critique the very 
documents, artifacts, and even visual practices that construct and maintain these spaces of power 
(p. 40). This essay does just this by attending to the unique artifacts of development’s mediation 
in their own contexts—and by emphasizing that a “recolonization” of the developing world takes 
place only through specific rhetorical practices. Not only did the Peters map as cartographic icon 
shape and organize a particular viewpoint of the world, the actual circulation of that visual 
representation of space over the course of 30 years perpetuated such powerful imaginaries of the 
world. In this way, the notion of recolonization suggests to postcolonial communication scholars 
that the very tools of colonialism, like maps, can also be appropriated as new forms of 
subjugation, even as they try to transcend their imperial histories. 
  
5 
To make such a contribution, I analyze the visual conventions of the Peters map closely, 
while also evaluating the circulation of the map against the international forces that perpetuated 
such an eventful rhetorical life. In the first section, I begin by contextualizing the Peters 
projection within both the movements of decolonization and international development, in order 
to demonstrate how the rhetoric of modernization enacted new forms of control. Then, I discuss 
the dual function of the map’s display and circulation through the following themes: 1) the 
subversion of form in the Peters projection’s rhetorical display, particularly in its politicization of 
area and its choice to use liberal “equality” as its corrective standard; 2) the context of the map’s 
circulation as an icon for internationalism and development; and 3) the map’s sparking of a 
disciplinary crisis in cartography as a whole, particularly in the debates around both positivism 
and radicalism in mapping during the Cold War. Through each of these themes, I advance the 
central argument that the Peters map’s form and circulation complicated its bold, anti-colonial 
message by advancing frameworks of liberal Western modernization and development, thereby 
introducing a recolonization of the Southern hemisphere. Overall, the essay confirms how 
cartography articulated anxieties over the representations of North/South in the Cold War and 
located the ideological struggles between colonialism, anti-colonialism, and international 
development in both latitude and longitude. 
The Three-Tiered Cartography of the Cold War 
The notion of a “recolonization” recognizes, through a post-colonial lens, that the demise 
of European colonialism and its aftermath was far from a natural progression of self-determining 
nations progressing toward more modern and liberal social economic development—in practice, 
this narrative of dependency and difference between South and North needed to be crafted, 
protected, and perpetuated. The story of the need for Western-led progressive development in the 
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Cold War, in other words, became naturalized through hard rhetorical labor, and a widely 
circulating international icon like the Peters projection was instrumental in shaping that process. 
Before actually analyzing the visual conventions of the map and its eventful life, this section 
briefly provides the necessary context out of which the Peters map emerged, in order to trace 
how such a powerful narrative came to be. I engage with this context by a) tracing the discursive 
tensions between the North and South in the wake of colonialism’s demise, and b) engaging with 
cartography’s role as a colonizing mode of communication within these tensions. 
The “Third World” itself is both a fundamentally spatial and Cold War–centric concept. 
From its conception, it was continually contested and redefined, and it operated as a 
classification serving a variety of interests (Randall, 2004). The term itself has been attributed to 
French economist Alfred Sauvy in 1952 when he used it to demarcate “developing countries” in 
contrast to the two major Cold War power blocs (Pletsch, 1981). The idea of developed and 
undeveloped nations was not new. But in the early Cold War, the existence of two international 
economic systems at such loggerheads was new and thus the “third bloc” became a geopolitically 
significant, abstract space where the United States and the Soviet Union vied for influence 
(Berger, 1994). After the famed 1955 conference at Bandung, Indonesia, the idea of an 
international movement using “Third World” status as a kind of organizing, resistant banner 
became more and more viable (Wright, 1956; Kahin, 1956; Tan and Acharya, 2008). The 
concept of the Third World “served as both a hegemonic conceptualization of the world, and of 
struggles against that hegemony” for “the paradigms of capitalist modernity” and “radical 
advocates of liberation from Euro-American colonialism” (Dirlik, 2004, p. 133). And in Carl 
Pletsch’s estimation (1981) “the very thought of three worlds on one planet constrained even 
those who were opponents of the Cold War or partisans of the third world to do work that 
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contributed both to the strategies of containment and to the exploitation of the third world” (p. 
572). The phrase became a kind of “abbreviated ideology” that could represent both state power 
and its resistance (Beloff, 1978, pp. 12–13). 
Particularly from the standpoint of Western elites, though, the three worlds idea was 
inextricable from the modernization doctrines of Cold War social science and public policy. As a 
discourse, modernization argued that with knowledge and instruments, underdeveloped 
civilizations could advance themselves. The three worlds concept folded space into time, 
partitioning the “one-world” into a continental hierarchy where certain spaces are frozen onto the 
map as always “arriving” (Agnew, 2003, p. 47). In this process, as Arturo Escobar (1992) points 
out, “to represent the Third World as ‘underdeveloped’ is less a statement about ‘facts’ than 
setting up a regime of truth through which the Third World is inevitably known, intervened on, 
and managed” (p. 62). This management of knowledge defined Third World space by what it 
“lacked” (whether in money, political stability, health—even in developing nations’ abilities to 
properly map themselves) (Slater, 1997). In turn, the First World and the Second World would 
define themselves and each other around the ways they could meet this lack.  
Despite the ways that the Third World was defined as underdeveloped and backward, it is 
important to note how the South became a powerful geopolitical trope (Saull, 2005). While this 
“mass” South was often presented as a passive repository of Cold War interests, it was just as 
often appropriated (and feared) for its potential strength and threat (Buchanan, 1964). As 
geographer Donald W. Meinig wondered aloud as early as 1956, “Is it not ironic that in this 
era…of unprecedented concentration of military power in the hands of two powerful 
nations…the small nation, the obscure culture group, the wholly non-industrialized people, are 
able to exert far greater force upon the complexion of events than in the past?” (p. 220). Indeed, 
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historians such as David Painter (1995) and Odd Arne Westad (2006) made clear that the 
influence of the South on the actions of the so-called North in the Cold War was not merely 
about security and economic influence—it was about deeply embedded historical beliefs.  
The notion of recolonization becomes particularly salient here because, while traditional 
colonial control may have been seen as more invasive and totalizing, the new subtler and softer 
brand of colonialism retained a peculiar controlling power of its own, as nation-states were 
compelled to enter the framework of “becoming” modern. Such recolonization involved a sense 
of idealism about Western powers being able to altruistically improve the fortunes of a 
globalizing world through sharing (or imposing) of industrial, economic, and educational 
techniques and programs. At the same time, this idealism existed uneasily alongside a fear of the 
South’s ability to rise and become powerful on its own—or worse, to fall under socialist 
influence. Amidst the tumult of decolonization, Edward Said (1978) noted a “distribution of 
geopolitical awareness” that resulted in “a whole series of ‘interests’ [that] is, rather than 
expresses, a certain will of intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to 
incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world” (p. 12).  
With the politicization of the equatorial masses, the North was cultivating a new 
geopolitical will to incorporate and control the Third World by producing massive amounts of 
knowledge about it (Suri, 2006). The replacement of East/West with North/South set up new 
“processes of subjectification,” in Homi Bhabha’s terms (1996, pp. 37–38), where there were 
constant attempts to “fix” the developing nations’ places in the world. For Westad,  
In a historical sense—and especially as seen from the South—the Cold War was a 
continuation of colonialism through slightly different means. As a process of conflict, it 
centered on control and domination, primarily in ideological terms. The methods of the 
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superpowers and of their local allies were remarkably similar to those honed during the 
last phase of European colonialism: giant social and economic projects, bringing 
promises of modernity to their supporters….(p. 396). 
The Peters controversy, coming at the early 1970s apex of still-violent struggles over 
decolonization particularly in Africa, exists at this transition where the end of the colonial system 
begets a search for a new system—one that the tiered world of development seemed to fit. 
Cartography served as an apt mediator for this transition—able to account for the global 
spread of markets and its accompanying ideologies through the map’s ability to compress the 
world into one visual field. Cartography had long been a form of surveillance, managing 
complex data and simplifying territorial space to align with certain universal, characteristics; as 
Denis Wood (1992) famously wrote, “The map links the territory with what comes with it” (10). 
Scholars have amply documented the imperial origins of mapping and the nation-state’s use of 
geographic knowledge to survey and control (see especially Edney, 1997, and Brotton, 2012)—
and the world after colonialism put this cartographic framework into question. Yet, like those 
maps of empire from the 18th and 19th centuries, many political maps of the post-WWII period, 
however subtly, imposed a view of the world supporting what John Hobson (2012) has called the 
“subliminal Eurocentrism” and paternalistic “liberal civilizing mission” of Third World 
development (p. 199). The era’s rise of geography as a quantitative social science aided this 
global movement in its ability to synthesize immense amounts of data about the growth of nation 
states that were suddenly independent (McMaster and McMaster, 2002). From popular maps to 
institutional maps to alternative maps of protest, the content of cartography was expanding 
exponentially into covering a wider range of social and political topics to keep up with the 
decolonization explosion (Robinson, Morrison, and Muehrcke, 1977). But because the form of 
  
10 
the map was still often conceived as a technical system of scientific techniques, those social and 
political functions could be downplayed as simply being part of an objective survey of the 
globe—seemingly far away from the more overtly controlling aims of earlier, colonial maps. 
The central difference between the old colonial maps and the new maps of recolonization 
was that the new maps were less concrete (no spaces for conquest and expansion), but rather 
more abstract and universal in their aims. Cartographers and state representatives of the Cold 
War could see in one simple glance a potential world made at least somewhat stable through the 
influence of democracy and capital. Of course, Walter Mignolo’s work (2011) reminds us that 
“capitalism is not only a domain of economic transactions and exploitation of labor, but of 
control and management of knowledge and subjectivities” (p. 33). And the cartography of the 
Cold War was arguing for particular values that seemed almost contradictory: on one hand, maps 
like the Peters projection were shrouded in a powerful rhetoric of science and modern progress 
for all. On the other hand, this was rhetoric that could represent control and division just as 
starkly as the imperial maps of old. As Gearóid Ó Tuathail (1996) notes, “the struggle over 
geography is…a contest of power and resistance that involves not only struggles to represent the 
materiality of physical geographic objects and boundaries but also…the equally material force of 
discursive borders between an idealized Self and a demonized Other, between us and them” (pp. 
14–15). As progressive as their aims could be, these maps still set up powerful divisions between 
a developed and a developing world. And it is, perhaps, the Peters map’s visual display of “area” 
for the Third World that accentuates these divisions most forcefully. 
The Form of the Third World: The Politicization of Area in the Peters Map 
The most infamous critique of the Peters projection came from Arthur Robinson (1985), 
one of the most distinguished American academics in cartography, as he pointed out that, “On 
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the ‘Peters projection’ the landmasses are somewhat reminiscent of wet, ragged, long, winter 
underwear hung out to dry on the Arctic circle” (p. 104). Upon Peters’ death in 2002, British 
geographer Peter Vujakovic (2003a) even eulogized him with a large cartoon of Peters dutifully 
standing in front of a clothesline putting out the world’s continents to air. These images speak to 
Peters’ central conceit: the rhetorical choice to emphasize the accurate area of the world’s 
continents over the accuracy of their shape. This section explores the consequences of this 
important move, particularly in how the Peters map’s specific definition of equality makes a 
powerful recolonization (through development) of the South by the North seem natural and 
progressive in the wake of European colonialism.  
The first noticeable visual effect of the Peters map is the elongation of the areas in the 
middle, which Peters manages by relegating the equator to the exact middle of the map. As 
Henrikson (1979) writes, “On most Mercator maps, the Equator is located well below the middle, 
resulting in a kind of global pituitary problem: North America and Eurasia are giant-sized, South 
America and Africa are dwarfed” (p. 175). By contrast, in Peters’ map, the continents of South 
America and Africa, as well as the region of Southeast Asia dominate the visual field (figs. 3 and 
4). Porter and Voxland (1986) derided this “squeezed accordion” effect as only being able to 
“give north and south” and thus useless in terms of calculating distance (a hallmark strength of 
the Mercator) (p. 27). In terms of Cold War geopolitics, the air-age globalism of the 1940s 
posited the airplane’s shrinking of distance as the new measurement standard on the map; here it 
is the sheer scale and population power of the equatorial masses that serves as the new standard. 
While the de-emphasis on Western Europe and America was central to the map’s arguments, the 
challenge to “Second World” areal power was also made clear. The Soviet Union is stretched 
into a flatter and less imposing shape, and its more extreme placement in the upper North 
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“squashes” the usually sprawling Soviet Republics together. As Peters told the Guardian, “It 
makes it easy to see why the Russians are so nervous about the Chinese” (Morris, 1973, p. 15). 
The recalculation of area articulated anxieties and new vulnerabilities in the fault lines of the 
Cold War. 
In this way, Peters’ claims to fidelity and consistency through the principle of equality 
posit cartography as a fusion between form and content. The scientific use of equality in scale 
and coverage of particular places in his maps parallel the ideological argument for equality 
amongst nations and peoples. For example, part of Peters’ claim to cartographic equality is his 
promotion that all of his topographic maps in the Peters Atlas are on the same scale: each map 
uses an equal area scale, rather than one simply based on distance—one square centimeter on the 
map equals 6,000 square kilometers in reality. Peters’ collaborating cartographer, Terry Hardaker 
(1990), notes in his introduction to the atlas,  
We have come to accept as ‘natural’ a representation of the world that devotes 
disproportionate space to large scale maps of areas perceived as important, while 
consigning other areas to small-scale general maps. And it is because our image of the 
world has become thus conditioned, that we have for so long failed to recognize the 
distortion for what it is—the equivalent of peering at Europe and North America through 
a magnifying glass (p. 6). 
This challenges the reader’s sense of formal expectations: in the topographic section, we get to 
see the relative size of Britain to, say, Madagascar, which is surprisingly larger in area. In this 
way, Peters sought to minimize the propensity for misrepresentation and distortion, and to give 
readers accurate world comparatives. This would often be a point of contention with critics; 
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Monmonier (1995), for example, wrote that “Peters’s claim of ‘fairness to all peoples’ seems less 
accurate than ‘fairness to all acres’” (p. 35). 
 Such critiques hint at the potential tendency for the Peters map to impose a new 
colonizing vision through its symbolic choices of color, shape, and iconography. For example, 
most versions of the Peters world maps feature a color scheme that relegates certain color 
“families” to particular continents: Europe gets shades of roses and pinks, Asia gets lavenders 
and deeper purples etc. The New Internationalist (1983), publishing the first English-language 
edition, highlighted this use of color as an innovation: “One of the most potent symbols of the 
dissolution of the British Empire, for those old enough to remember it, has been the 
disappearance of those splashes of red around the world. Indeed since the 1960s there has been 
relatively little need for political maps which give the same colour to countries under the same 
administration—since most are now independent Peters suggests that we start again and, instead 
of emphasizing the difference between countries, we should highlight the growing links between 
nations in the same region” (para. 26). Kaiser’s guide to the Peters’ (1987) supports this, adding:  
Regional and national identities more and more take precedence over a relationship that 
owes its origin and its continuation to forcible conquest and foreign domination. 
Therefore Peters conceived the idea of showing a whole region in one dominant color-
family, with each nation having its own variant. Thus the “family connections” as well as 
the separateness of each country can be shown (p. 23). 
The color scheme speaks to the context of decolonization: by choosing to give each state its own 
shade of the color “family,” Peters’ map reifies the power of regional stereotyping in the Cold 
War—that each political unit has its own voice, but is still part of a “bloc” of similar voices. In 
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an important sense, this grouping reduces the intensely volatile transnational relationships 
between such “families.”   
The potential problem is that in spite of its focus on equality and distribution, the Peters 
map retains a partitioned world of distinct landmasses as an enduring feature of a global 
geographic imagination, what Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen (1997) calls the problematic 
“myth of continents.” This myth advances that there are somehow significant cultural groupings 
denoted by these divisions and that continents are still useful units of analysis. According to 
Lewis and Wigen, the continental framework may conveniently “structure our perceptions of the 
human community” but “does injustice to the complexities of global geography, and it leads to 
faulty comparisons. When used by those who wield political power, its consequences can be 
truly tragic” (p. 1). The complications of the changing world of the decolonizing late-Cold War 
world and the individual identities of the emergent nations are left off the Peters map in favor of 
a simplified political message, implying that the West still has a power to define the fates of 
Third World nations.  
 In addition, the Peters map and its politicization of area cannot be understood without 
being seen as engaged in a dialectical kind of tension with the Mercator projection, which 
somewhat ironically contributes to this sense of re-colonization. The Peters projection is almost 
always consistently drawn (and debated) in reference to the Mercator map by Peters himself, his 
critics, and in media coverage of the map. Therefore, while Peters seeks a total replacement of 
the Mercator, his own projection draws its power through comparison, always referring back to 
the visual memory of the Mercator that he assumes his audiences share collectively. For example, 
in the version of the Peters map distributed by the United Nations Development Program, the 
margin of the main world map is filled with a series of insets—these constitute a group of 
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comparatives meant to indict the falsities of the Mercator, particularly in terms of areal distortion 
(see Figure 1 again). In one inset, the top half of the world above Mexico and Asia is colored in 
black, while the rest is colored in gray, captioned by the staggering statistic that the “North” is 
18.9 million square miles, while the “South” is 38.6 million square miles. Visually, this black 
and white bipolar Mercator presentation stands in contrast to the multi-colored visual explosion 
of the larger Peters map.  
Such contrasts render the Mercator as politicized, unscientific, and outdated, while the 
Peters map is billed as the clear, untainted frame of objectivity for the future. Indeed, Peters’ 
sweeping version of history in his writings bear this out—in the New Cartography (1983) he 
refers to the end of “the work of cartographers of a bygone age – the age of European domination 
and exploitation,” an age being replaced, as he says, by a “worldwide consciousness of solidarity” 
(p. 7). Critics derided Peters’ background as a historian for imposing this kind of linearity on the 
development of projections, rather than viewing the world like a cartographer, where different 
projections could be useful depending on the mapmaker’s purposes (Vujakovic, 1988, p. 5). And 
because the Peters map has to invoke the Mercator, its utility as a radical innovation may be 
tempered. Peters’ map insists on the same detached, rectangular, and omniscient vision of space 
that characterizes the Mercator. The conundrum is in how much its calls to radicalism through 
equality can truly inculcate an anti-colonial world vision. 
In this way, one of the most important challenges facing the Peters projection is that 
while it makes “equality” a central corrective measure of the map, the projection (and the agents 
of its ensuing circulation) does not make a critique of equality itself—it accepts and imposes a 
particularly liberal vision of equality. The Peters map’s equality of area implies a brand of social 
justice based on distribution—indeed, historian Jeremy Black (1997) once called the Peters 
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projection a “redistributive polemic” (p. 33). By correcting area, users of the map can supposedly 
see plainly where the redistribution of global resources should take place. Similar to how the 
Mercator map based its colonial vision of the world on the potential openness for sea trade and 
exploration, the Peters map enhances the area of the Southern nations to mark as “self-evident” 
the regions where the West should direct its aid and economic investments. The power of the 
West doesn’t diminish necessarily on the Peters map—rather, it offers a new set of prescriptives 
for influence in the future. In other words, the politics have changed, but the universal 
presentation of the world for a Western gaze remains—development becomes as inevitable and 
commonsense as colonial intervention.  
Thus, even a map sensitive to the history of colonialism such as the Peters projection still 
equates equality with sameness and constructs the global South as a mass. As Iris M. Young 
(1990) has written, “It is a mistake to reduce social justice to distribution” as this “tends to focus 
thinking about social justice on the allocation of material goods such as things, resources, income, 
and wealth,” which “tends to ignore the social structure and institutional context that often help 
determine distributive patterns” (p. 15). In basing the map in a paradigm of redistribution, Peters 
may have limited his ability to critique the North’s own hegemonic standards and structures, and 
helped to perpetuate the kind of “difference” that allowed European and American policymakers 
and aid groups to re-colonize the spaces of the Third World through the ideologies of 
development. Overall, the choice to offer the startling contrast in area is used provocatively to 
alarm readers at the ballooning size of the Third World. In turn, this contrast incites audiences 
towards actively re-directing the unpredictable energy of anti-colonial liberation and 
independence toward a controlled dependency on Western influences. And this kind of 
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redirection can be seen even more clearly in the Peters projection long-gestating transformation 
into an international development symbol. 
North, South, and the Iconization of Development in the Peters Projection   
While the internal form of the Peters map offered a complex presentation of equality 
through area, the map’s external circulation suggests that the Peters seemed less to equalize the 
North and South and more to dramatize the scope of the South’s “problems” and promote the 
self-evident need for modernization. By tracing the busy rhetorical life of the Peters map’s 
elevation to an international icon, this section offers that the Peters map arguably became less of 
a militant banner of social change, and more of a symbolic accommodation to the Eurocentric 
altruism of “bringing up” the South. Many diverse groups, from international development 
organizations to global religious movements, were using the Peters projection to connote a sense 
of rupture with past colonial practices, but at the same time were imposing a new set of 
structures (in the form of economic, political, and social development) to replace colonialism, 
even if those structures may have been more abstract and ideological. In the process, the Peters 
projection complied with a positivist story about what “progress” should mean for burgeoning 
nation-states and organized how such nations should self-identify in the face of Cold War 
superpower influence.  
As Hariman and Lucaites (2002) explain, “one reason images become iconic is that they 
coordinate a number of different patterns of identification within the social life of the 
audience…which together provide a public audience with sufficient means to comprehend 
potentially unmanageable events….” (p. 367). And the way in which that icon helps manage 
events and contexts is powerful—as Catherine Palczewski (2005) notes, icons are always 
“referential forms” that can become “appeals to fix and stabilize” in “the face of social pressures 
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of destabilization” (p. 388). The elevation of the Peters map into the iconic is important, 
becoming a kind of “totalizing discourse,” rather than simply a geographic image of spatial 
relationships (Cosgrove, 1994, pp. 287–88). As the bipolar, East-West geopolitical frameworks 
were being destabilized in the rise of the non-aligned movements in the Third World and 
international development organizations, the Peters projection offered itself as a political 
shorthand for an alternative interpretation of Cold War space. As Peters himself understood, “My 
projection has ceased to be just a piece of mathematics or cartography—it is now a symbol” 
(Spicer, 1989, p. 42).  
The influential “Brandt Report’s” support and circulation of the Peters projection 
demonstrates well the map’s transformation into an icon of distributive justice, but also the 
problem of replacing colonial ideologies with another set of potentially hegemonic frameworks. 
In 1980, the Independent Commission on International Development Issues released the 
influential report North-South: A Programme For Survival, comprising representatives from over 
20 countries and outlining a humanitarian and economic system of world development. The 
group was convened and led by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, internationally 
known for Ostpolitik and the thawing of East-West relations in Germany. While debate was 
widespread about the politics behind the commission, the publicity of their report was extensive 
(Williams, 1980; Bird, 1980). And, sure enough, the cover of the report was the Peters 
projection: rendered simply in red over a gridded background, with a stark, thick black line 
running over Mexico, over the tip of Africa up through China, and then dramatically dipping 
below Australia. The inside flap of the report read, “This projection represents an important step 
away from the prevailing Eurocentric geographical and cultural concept of the world…the more 
densely settled earth zones, it is claimed, appear in proper proportion to each other.” With the 
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powerful picture of Western development gurus like Brandt standing in front of massive 
backdrops of the Peters projection at international conferences, and through its use in the popular 
printed report, the irony of a newer Eurocentric viewpoint replacing an older Eurocentric 
viewpoint is on full display. In this case, the leaders of Europe are invested by visual icons like 
the Peters map with the license to order and classify world space according to specific Western 
ideas of liberal progression and economic advancement. 
The ensuing diversity of the map’s appropriation would continue to showcase this iconic 
function, and its implications for recolonization. In addition to the Brandt Commission, other 
development organizations such as the Overseas Development Institute would use it in 
publications like their EEC and the Third World (1981), similarly as a kind of a simplified logo. 
The UN Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) used the Peters in its report on the 
least developed countries of the world, while it would also be appropriated into UN Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) brochures, and newsletters for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Organization (GATT – the precursor to the World Trade Organization) (Robinson, 1985). 
International charity group Action Aid would simplify the Peters into a logo for the masthead of 
its newspaper (Bain, 1984, p. 343).  
And the Peters map would circulate well beyond these supranational communities. Much 
was made out of the fact, for example, that the General Board of Global Ministries of the United 
Methodist Church had a Peters world map six feet high etched in glass at the entrance of its New 
York offices (Kaiser, 1987). Lutheran Church leaders also endorsed the map, with testimonials 
such as: “The Christian message includes an emphasis on justice for all, based on the love of 
God which is extended to all…The Peters map appears to be the best education tool for showing 
us our place on earth. The values and purposes of this map coincide well with the teachings of 
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the Bible and the church” (p. 26). The mere image of the Peters aesthetically connoted a sense of 
internationalist values for large religious organizations attempting to spread development of a 
different kind worldwide. 
In terms of its international education possibilities, coordinators at the Development 
Education Association, an international consortium of educators, would rave about the Peters 
map’s ability to teach the values of global citizenship (Ashmore, 2003). An eighth-grade math 
teacher from a Chicago Mexican immigrant community used the Peters to teach his students how 
to critically “read” the world, with one of his students reporting that, “doing this project has 
opened my eyes in different ways. I am learning how small details like maps have a lot to do 
with racism and power” (p. 58). And nonprofit groups like Broader Perspectives secured 
acceptance by the State Board of Education in Texas to integrate the Peters map into curricula 
since, they argued, it “demonstrates more accurate and objective perceptions of the significance 
of nations in both hemispheres” (Kaiser, 1987, p. 27). Academics in developing nations also 
became part of the Peters campaign: geographer Vernon Mulcasingh of the University of the 
West Indies commented that the map “represents a burst of brilliance that can be compared with 
any major breakthrough in the world of science” (p. 10).  
Through this diversity of usages and the wide circulation, the internationalist, progressive 
theme of development became a uniting, common theme. In many of these cases, the projection 
was divorced from its production and its connection to an atlas or scientific grid. In this way, the 
Peters map was abstracted as a “logo”—while Benedict Anderson (1991) spoke of “map-as-logo” 
in the sense of the shape of a nation state becoming a kind of “flag” logo in consolidating 
nationalist imaginations, here the Peters map becomes a floating logo for an internationalist 
identity (p. 175). As an iconic emblem, the map could transcend its technical origins and be 
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appropriated to represent, above all, a collection of values. Brandt’s introduction to North-South 
(1980) was telling, as he wrote, “In the summer of 1978, half a year after we had started our 
work, a friend and distinguished African leader sent me an encouraging message: our 
Commission, he said, could ‘contribute to the development of worldwide moral values’” (p. 7).  
 The ability of the Peters map to project such values was often missed in the disciplinary 
debate by cartographers and scientists. After a survey of 42 NGOs on their perceptions and use 
of the Peters projection, Peter Vujakovic (1987) concluded that “the decisions to adopt the Peters 
projection are probably based on very restricted knowledge of cartography and on intuition 
regarding the value of its distinctive ‘image’. This is supported by the fact that very few of the 
organizations receive advice from professionals involved in cartography…It has become 
accepted as the ideologically correct map to use” (p. 14). The Peters projection was being 
measured according to two very different standards. Vujakovic was implicitly denigrating 
“ideological correctness,” “intuition,” and “image”—in a sense, rhetoric—as a factor in choosing 
to use a map as opposed to its function as a professional, scientific instrument. Conversely, 
development organizations saw the map as an encapsulation of internationalist moral values—a 
political statement that, for many, transcended the technical considerations for something more 
universal. Placing and maintaining the Southern nations on the path to Northern standards of 
economic and social success was considered a moral, civilizing duty, and the Peters projection 
mediated that mission for a host of international organizations.  
These many uses and reproductions of the Peters map by international development 
organizations, religious missions, and school groups (mostly of Western origin) raise questions 
around the thorny notion of “multiculturalism.” Shome (2012), for example, has questioned if 
Western overtures to multiculturalism during the post-WWII era have reiterated the kinds of 
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colonial “difference” that they were designed to replace, and wonders aloud whether the 
discourses of “multicultural democracies end up being alibis for a logic of exceptionalism in 
relation to many non-Western contexts (‘We are a pluralistic society; you are not’) (p. 145).” For 
Shome, the abstract goals of multiculturalism may be worthy, but as a communicative practice, 
the rhetoric of multiculturalism risks actually re-othering the so-called “rest of the world.” In its 
impressively wide circulation, the Peters map is celebrated as a multicultural touchstone, from 
inside classrooms right up to heavily mediated international summits. But perhaps it is the very 
internationalist, multicultural status of the Peters map that tends to recolonize the de-colonized 
world by way of a universal, moral corrective. Roxanne Doty (1996) has written of how 
Northern elites have often seen the cultural “difference” between North and South as something 
that can be scientifically managed by Northern powers—a piece of cartography that spatially 
plots this sense of difference may have proven ideal for that management job. 
This reproduction of difference reminds us that while many global institutions used 
Peters to idealistically bring all three “worlds” together, these groups were still part of the 
contentious context of Cold War geopolitics, thus making the map’s internationalist identity still 
beholden to more nationalistic ends. Mignolo (2000) remarked on Cold War “cosmopolitanism,” 
where international spatial relationships were redefined by Western elites in terms of 
interdependency and human rights through the “master discourse” of political economy (pp. 
737–38). In this move to interdependency, the “language of developing under-developed nations 
as an alternative to communism” became integral; the problem was that during the Three World 
system, “decolonized countries were striving for a nation-state, at the same time that the 
ideologues of the new world order no longer believed in them” (p. 738). Peters’ image as icon, 
then, exists within the tense relationship between nationalism and internationalism. Development 
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organizations lent the Peters map a kind of cosmopolitanism to transcend Cold War antagonisms, 
but this was done largely from the national viewpoints of Western elites.  
Because of this, the Peters map downplayed the realities of self-determination and 
nationhood that other cartographic icons were able to encapsulate. For example, the original 
OPEC logo of the 1970s featured an ellipse that centered on the Middle East and Africa, with the 
bottom half of Asia and South America rounding out the Eastern and Western sides of the map—
Europe , North America, and the Soviet Union were completely omitted from the image 
(Henrikson, 1979). The Peters map still needed to have the two spaces visualized in relationship 
to one another (the South still needed the North); but the OPEC map argued that the Northern 
half of the world was largely irrelevant to the political and economic advancement of the so-
called developing nations. Such logos remind us that the Peters map was still adhering, in many 
ways, to traditional cartography, rooted in the values of universality that were not always shared 
by the nations it purported to represent more “accurately.” 
In summary, while the Peters map allows non-governmental development organizations 
to transcend the influence of particular nation-states like the U.S. or the U.K. for a more 
cosmopolitan, international image, the act of drawing developing nations as one united mass of 
Southern protest against the North potentially re-bipolarizes the Cold War. In turn, this kind of 
circulation and appropriation of Peters reasserts a kind of colonial control of North over South, 
even if under the cosmopolitan guise of international economic development. The final section 
looks at one particularly explosive articulation of Peters’ tensions between decolonization and 
recolonization: the passionate debate around the function of science and values in cartography 
revolving around the burgeoning popularity of the Peters map. 
Disciplining the Peters: Ideology and Scientific Practice in the Peters Debates 
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In this final section, the often strident academic reception of the Peters projection is 
situated as an important piece of the map’s re-colonizing function. Detractors of the map could 
deflect the radical aspects of Peters’ message by redirecting the projection towards a more 
traditional debate over method and form. In the process, such scholars were bringing the Peters 
map into the realm of the new “enlightened” post-WWII value on cartography as science, a move 
that even Arno Peters himself became complicit in. In a burgeoning age of globalization, 
cartographers were upholding the ability (and duty) of Western liberal experts to draw the world 
according to sanctioned standards and decorum.  
 While the Peters map circulated widely during the 1970s and development and aid 
groups distributed them for some time, the true fire of the academic response did not reach its 
hottest point until the late 1980s—and the bile of some of the critiques has become legendary. 
Vujakovic (2003b) recounted a call he made to a prominent (unnamed) colleague when “the 
mention of Peters was enough to cause a stream of invective to be directed down the telephone 
line” (p. 61). Monmonier (1996) railed against news outlets, who he claimed “covered the story 
as if [Peters] were a courageous innovator challenging a cartel of racist fuddy-duddies” (p. 22). 
Perhaps the apex of the Peters’ debate came when the American Congress on Surveying and 
Mapping simply had enough and declared all rectangular world maps obsolete and dangerous. 
The story was noteworthy enough for the Wall Street Journal, reporting that the ACSM “adopts 
a sternly worded resolution condemning such maps for ‘showing the round earth as having 
straight edges and sharp corners’” (Winans, p. A1).The official resolution declared:  
WHEREAS, world maps have a powerful and lasting effect on peoples’ impressions of 
the shapes and sizes of lands and seas, their arrangement, and the nature of the coordinate 
system, and WHEREAS, frequently seeing a greatly distorted map tends to make it “look 
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right,” we strongly urge book and map publishers, the media, and government agencies to 
cease using rectangular world maps for general purposes or artistic displays. Such maps 
promote serious, erroneous conceptions (Robinson, 1990, p. 101). 
Over 300 copies of the resolution were distributed to media outlets, and was officially endorsed 
by all major American geographic societies. While Peters is nowhere mentioned in the resolution, 
the decision of these prominent organizations to take an official stance on the “rectangular” map 
seemed a veiled way of condemning the Mercator and the Peters in one fell swoop. ACSM 
member Arthur Robinson defended the measure’s public opinion function by writing that the 
committee “hoped it would, over time, help to make the public aware of how seriously distorted 
is any rectangular portrayal of the spherical earth” (pp. 103–4). The field’s standards of 
authorship and commitment to innovation and thoroughness had been violated, resulting in an 
uneasiness about what was to come in the future for maps.  
 Peters’ sympathizers like Wood and Fels (2008) referred to this declaration as a 
“preposterous (and wholly ineffectual) resolution,” but used it as an example of just how deeply 
the projection had shaken the discipline (p. 11). Due to necessities in military and foreign policy 
applications, post-WWII geography had long been resituated as a quantitative social science, and 
maps were increasingly drawn by experts to solve particular strategic problems (Farish, 2010; 
Cloud, 2002). The production of cartographic knowledge, thus, was often a guarded process. On 
a 1983 NPR broadcast of “All Things Considered,” David Malpus interviewed Ward Kaiser, 
Peters’ main translator and promoter in Britain and the U.S. When Malpus asked Kaiser why the 
Peters map does not show Africa in its normal shape, Kaiser answered that, “Well, one needs to 
ask what is the normal shape of Africa? Without having seen Africa from outer space, I’m really 
not in a very good position, nor perhaps [is] any of us, to say how it actually looks” (Snyder, 
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1988, pp. 191–92). Geographer John Snyder’s ensuing response to Kaiser represents the kind of 
terms by which scientific cartographers were assessing the debate, as he protested, “But because 
we have navigators’ and surveyors’ mapping work applied to our globes, as well as the new 
evidence of photographs by astronauts, we know very well how Africa looks from space!” (p. 
192). In Snyder’s terms, the trusted tools of scientific experts have already given us what we 
need to envision continental space with accuracy, making the Peters projection useless.  
In many ways, the debate was about the concept of “disciplining” cartography. Edney 
(1997) has written of this concept, where the map serves not just as a tool of state power, but also 
to perpetuate a progressive narrative about the worth of cartography as a discipline. Much of the 
push and pull between the acolytes and the detractors of the Peters map goes back to whether the 
map would be used as a political statement or a scientific device. Supporters emblemized the 
Peters projection, making it into an icon for development and Third World identity, and 
removing it from its mathematical plane. Conversely, critical voices often were attempting to de-
iconize the map—to reclaim the Peters map as a scientific document and a system of calculations, 
and to bring it back to the grid and debate its technical merits.  
The function of this “disciplining,” of course, tended to obscure the underlying politics 
that the Peters map brought forth. At least in the initial debates about Peters, there was little 
discussion about what it meant to “map” the Third World, or about the discipline’s approach to 
issues of ideology and social justice. Peters had certainly produced new knowledges for the field 
in respect to ideology etc., but as Crampton (2003) points out, these were, at least at the time, 
“disqualified knowledges” (p. 55). Peters himself did not, however, remain un-implicated in this 
disciplining: he was certainly aware of the provocative power of a map to challenge worldviews, 
but he also subscribed to the positivistic narrative that cartography is part of a search for truth. In 
  
27 
his continual insistence that his map was the most accurate picture of the world, and that his new 
projection could ALONE rectify Eurocentric inequalities, he problematically adhered to the 
cartographic discipline’s standards and values. In his claims to truth, Peters upheld 
representation as the key function of his map—the same paradigm of cartography in which many 
of his critics were working under. Therefore, Peters was often easily brought up as a straw man 
by cartographers to show how his claims to objectivity and accuracy were a farce. Rather than 
ask why international organizations would want the Peters projection to represent their global 
missions, cartographers could instead claim that Peters was simply manipulating these groups 
through his deceptive marketing campaign. From both sides, a sense of self-reflexivity about a 
mapmaker’s positionality vis-à-vis the Third World was missing.  
The volley of debates can be seen as an attempt by professionals and academics to close 
ranks on the amateurish methods and blatant self-promotion of Arno Peters (Harley, 2001). But 
more importantly for the argument of this essay, the anger at the Peters projection was also part 
of the decolonization/recolonization tensions of its late-Cold War context. Cartography’s rise as 
a tool of imperialism and colonial control in the 1700s and 1800s also coincides with its 
emergence as a scientific enterprise perceived to be value-free. By the last half of the twentieth 
century, though, in the face of a rapidly decolonizing world, mapping’s entire function was 
called into question. In the highly technologized world of the Cold War, cartographic 
professionals dedicated themselves to new methods and projections that could stabilize once 
again our sense of the world. Such new maps could easily support the progressive ideologies of 
development and modernization—the new kind of recolonization of the South by Northern 
powers looking to universalize capital and global technologies.  
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What incensed these cartographers, then, perhaps most was not that the Peters map was 
baring its ideological goals (most mappers had long admitted inevitable subjectivity in maps) but 
that they felt Peters was damaging the professional decorum of a long-hallowed discipline. These 
cartographers were not calling for a return to the colonial and imperial functions of the maps of 
old, but they did have a vested interest in continuing to perpetuate the primary value of liberal 
expertise. The ideologies of development also shared that premium on expertise—that the expert 
professionals of the North could provide models for and train the self-determining peoples of the 
Third World. Peters jeopardized this process by calling attention to maps as symbols that could 
be appropriated outside of the control of cartographic experts. While Peters and his detractors 
both represented very different sides of a Cold War-era argument around science and value, they 
both articulated the difficulties in continuing, as Westad says, “colonialism through slightly 
different means.”  
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the Peters projection has not stood as the lone map to challenge the 
Eurocentrist, colonial framework under which much of the world lived for centuries. An 
impressive diversity of maps has taken up this mantle, both in professional science and in 
popular culture. Arthur Robinson’s projection improved abilities to see the realities of a curved 
earth on the flat page (used by National Geographic through the end of the Cold War and after, 
until it adopted the further improvements of the Winkel Tripel projection in 1998). The Hobo 
Dyer projection of 2002 used equal-area but corrected the distorted shapes of Peters, and was 
often printed innovatively with both north-upwards and south-upwards versions—eventually 
rewarded with wide circulation after President Carter used it for his Nobel Peace Prize speech.  
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And, yet, the timing of the Peters map’s introduction to international discourse and its 
popularity remains unique and important. As Mignolo (2011) writes, a “project of 
Westernization” thrived in the Cold War “not by appropriating land, but by managing finances 
and natural resources through the project of development and modernization, in two stages: from 
1950 to 1970, when the project collapsed, and from 1980 to 2008, when the project revived. In 
the second stage, development was translated into globalism, the conceptual tool of neo-liberal 
designs” (32). A host of development organizations, NGOs, and other global institutions were 
taking up the Peters projection at a time when development transitioned toward globalism. The 
Peters map mediated, if not helped to shape, a distributionist brand of equality and social justice 
that fed globalization’s growth.  
Since Peters’ work must be re-contextualized as part of the Cold War’s powerful re-
colonizing shift to development, situating the map’s role as an artifact of visual communication 
in its specific context becomes central. The Peters projection does not simply depict the space of 
the world at a particular time, it is constituted through it—and the very form of the map becomes 
part of the material experience of the Cold War. In the process, the map frames the South as 
perpetually moving towards (but never reaching) the standards of the North—time and space are 
powerfully suspended. On one hand, the Peters projection can be seen as, in Graham Huggan’s 
words (1989),  
A deconstructive reading of the Western map…one which, focusing on the inevitable 
discrepancy between the ‘natural’ and the ‘imitated’ object, displaces the ‘original’ 
presence of the West in such a way as to undermine the ideology which justifies its 
relations of power. This operation of displacement is tantamount to a ‘decolonization’ of 
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the map, where decolonization entails an identification of and perceived dissociation 
from the empowering strategies of colonial discourse (p. 121). 
Yet, on the other hand, Huggan acknowledges that any map is “characterized by the discrepancy 
which marks out the ‘recognizable totality’ of the map as a manifestation of the desire for control” 
and must negotiate “the ‘rules’ of cartography, both those which function overtly in the 
systematic organization of the map and those which are implied in the empowering methods of 
its production” (p. 117; 119). The Peters map falls into Huggan’s contradiction: the projection 
makes no attempts to fall back on cartography’s history of relegating overt ideology and 
advocacy to the margins; yet, in its displacement of one universal vision of the world comes 
another totalizing vision, thus making Peters’ claims of representing a new global order built on 
equality problematic.  
Therefore, the Peters map ended up reproducing, however unwittingly, many of the 
colonial assumptions it was critiquing, except now under the more subtle intervention of liberal 
development. Certainly, the Peters projection frames the problem of colonial space quite 
eloquently—but it lacks a mechanism to offer a solution, an issue that radical maps regularly 
struggle with (Barney, 2009). In the void of that solution, international development groups 
answered that the Western, liberal ideology of progress and “becoming” could perhaps do the 
trick. And the Peters map’s loud critics also reproduced that ideology of progress by questioning 
whether Peters’ method could even be part of such a narrative. Maps like Peters’ that argue for a 
“third way” out of superpower visions still negotiate a rhetorical tension of both resistance and 
control, disputing the colonial history of cartography while still embodying much of its stylistic 
assumptions. The Peters projection, in fact, goes further than merely embodying these 
assumptions, however—the map’s remarkable circulation helped the development movement 
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enact a re-colonization of the Southern hemisphere. As Matthew Edney (1997) has written, “as 
with any form of representation—graphic or textual, artifactual or ephemeral, meaning is 
invested in all aspects of cartography: in the instrumentation and technologies wielded by the 
geographer; in the social relations within which maps are made and used; and, in the cultural 
expectations which define, and which are defined by, the map image” (p. 24). Altogether, the 
Peters controversy reveals how concepts of North/South and East/West become both challenged 
and reified by the internal choices of the mapmaker as well as the external ways in which the 
map is appropriated, circulated, and debated.  
 If the “coloniality of power” was often maintained by the continuous production of 
difference, then re-colonization is an important concept for communication scholars to trace in 
the post-WWII landscape—to see how difference is reproduced in practice, and to trace the roots 
of how the emergent South is consistently classified and “managed” by the North. In the spirit of 
Shome and Hegde’s call for scholars to “account for the ways in which the Western realities 
have spread across the world as the universal condition” (261), the critique of development sits at 
the heart of postcolonial scholarship in communication. The often-unquestioned narratives of 
equality, distribution, multiculturalism, and scientific management require scholars to find 
specific, historically situated cases of these stories’ mediation and reproduction.  
The questions around the legacy of Peters are still relevant—and still challenging. As 
Jerry Brotton (2012) puts it: “Peters implied that it was possible to address political inequality. 
Size, at least for Peters, did matter. But, as another critic asked, did a more accurate 
representation of the size of Indonesia really address that country’s exceptionally high infant 
mortality rate, or only further obscure it?” (p. 383). Put more broadly, David Cooper (1983) asks, 
“Since area alone is neither the cause nor the symptom of the division between North and South, 
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does this map improve our understanding of the problems of the world?” (p. 416) Of course, 
maps are not necessarily expected to provide that kind of portrait, and it could be enough that 
this map portrays a “politics of difference” in situating perception as a key factor in North/South 
relations. Still, the lingering, unanswerable question remains: are all maps so constrained by 
cartography’s history as a colonial and imperial science that a truly radical cartography is 
impossible? Is it enough that Peters jumpstarted a thirty-plus year debate, or should 
cartographers have pushed themselves further into more projects of activism? 
To pose these questions is not to criticize the Peters map for what it somehow did not do, 
but they are posed in the spirit, as is this essay overall, of properly contextualizing an icon of 
cartography. What the Peters projection did do was serve as a visual rhetoric reminding its users 
that the Northern superpowers are not “self-constituting, autonomous entities, whose societies 
and economies develop entirely independently of non-Western economic, military, political and 
cultural interactions” (Hobson, 210). In other words, the politicized area of the South on the map 
at least reminds us that the world is constituted by spatial relationships, not natural givens.  
Peters’ map excites debate precisely because of its communicative abilities beyond what appears 
in the content of its display. A round of re-examination, for example, came through the obituaries 
of Peters in the Cartographic Journal, where Vujakovic (2003b) would write that “now, perhaps 
is the time to acknowledge a debt to Peters for bringing the discussion of the politico-social 
significance of mapping to such public prominence” (p. 66). As the Peters map reminds us, the 
volatility of spatial concepts like the Third World anchored global relations but also opened up 
the enticing possibilities of radical challenges to those relations. At the same time, if, according 
to Shome and Hegde (2002) “the politics of communication are of central importance in the 
understanding of the contradictions and ambivalence in our deeply divided world,” then the 
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Peters map’s political contradictions and dividing lines will also continue to remain compelling 
and instructive. 
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